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Via Federal Express 
Honorable Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice 
and Associate Justices 
Supreme Court of California 
350 McAllister Street, Room 1295 
San Francisco, California 94102-3600 
Re: Hardev Singh Grewal v. Amolak Singh Jammu et al. 
Court of Appeal Case No. A126239 
Request for Depublication 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1125(a)) 
Dear Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices: 
The ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties, the ACLU of Southern California, 
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, the Asian 
Pacific American Legal Center, a member of the Asian American Center for Advancing 
Justice, the Association of Alternative Newsweeklies, the Association of Southern 
California Defense Counsel, the California Anti-SLAPP Project, the California 
Broadcasters Association, the California Newspaper Publishers Association, the Center 
for Judicial Excellence, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, 
Dow Jones & Company, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Environmental Law 
Foundation, the First Amendment Coalition, the First Amendment Project, the Golden 
State Manufactured-Home Owners League, the Magazine Publishers of America, the 
Planning and Conservation League, and Public Counsel (collectively, the Coalition) 
respectfully urge this court to order the Court of Appeal's opinion in Grewal v. Jammu 
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977 (Grewal) not to be published in the official reports. 
Although Grewal is a straightforward appeal that implicated no important 
issues and involved no novel facts, the Court of Appeal published extensive dicta 
criticizing the anti-SLAPP statute's broad scope and its immediate right of appeal 
provision—points that were not addressed by the parties' briefs, were unnecessary to 
the resolution of the case before it, and which relied on erroneous examples of supposed 
abuse and misleading statistics to attack the anti-SLAPP statute. This is the rare case 
where depublication is necessary because Grewal's dicta will escape review since no 
petition for review has been filed and the issues necessary to the resolution of the case 
are not worthy of review. 
In particular, Grewal's dicta: (1) selectively cited cases in an effort to show that 
some defendants have supposedly filed abusive anti-SLAPP motions challenging claims 
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that, in Grewal's view, were not covered by the anti-SLAPP statute (Grewal, .supra, 191 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 999-1000) while ignoring contrary case authority concluding that 
the statute applies to such claims; and (2) relied on statistics that, in Grewal's view, 
show that the anti-SLAPP statute is being abused (id. at pp. 998-999) while ignoring 
the complete statistical record that shows no such abuse is occurring. The court then 
used this misleading "evidence" of abuse to attack a defendant's statutory right to 
immediately appeal anti-SLAPP orders and asserted that there is no helpful legislative 
history supporting this right (id. at pp. 998, 1000-1003) while seeking to minimize the 
significant legislative history favoring a defendant's right to appeal and the balance 
struck by the Legislature between vindicating defendants' rights under the statute 
through appeal and the delay plaintiffs face during that process. 
Absent depublication, Grewal's erroneous dicta will remain published, fostering 
confusion among litigants and courts as well as threatening to deter parties from filing 
proper anti-SLAPP motions and appeals that are necessary to protect their 
fundamental constitutional rights to free speech and petition from SLAPP suits. 
The interests of the Coalition 
The Coalition consists of public interest organizations, trade associations, and 
businesses who have widely disparate goals and interests but who all share at least one 
key common interest: protecting the constitutional rights to free speech and petition. 
The rights to free speech and to petition for redress of grievances are 
fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment and the California Constitution. 
(Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App .3d 400, 406.) Indeed, each of these ranks amongst 
the "most precious" of constitutional rights. (Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn. (1967) 
389 U.S. 217, 222; San Francisco Forty-Niners v. Nishioka (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 637, 
647.) 
The anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, is "vital 
legislation" (Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1366, disapproved 
on another ground by Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
53, 68, fn. 5)—a statute " ' "designed to protect citizens in the exercise of their First 
Amendment constitutional rights of free speech and petition" ' " (Bernardo v. Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 340). " "[T]he common 
feature of SLAPP suits are their lack of merit and chilling of defendants' valid exercise 
of free speech and the right to petition," ' " and section 425.16 " "was intended to 
address those features by providing a fast and inexpensive unmasking and dismissal of 
SLAPP's." ' " (Ibid.) Simply put, the Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute 
because it believed this legislation was "needed" to "protect the public from lawsuits 
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of First Amendment rights." (Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 307.) 
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Why depublication is necessary  
A. 	 Depublication is necessary because Grewal's dicta creates severe 
conflicts with the decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal as 
well as the statute's plain language, and threatens to chill the filing of 
proper anti-SLAPP motions. 
Grewal states in dicta that "actions against attorneys," "personal injury claims," 
and "insurance coverage cases" are all "cases that involve complaints that simply do 
not 'arise from' protected activity" covered by the anti-SLAPP statute yet in the Grewal 
court's view improperly "generate anti-SLAPP motions nevertheless." (Grewal, supra, 
191 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) Additionally, Grewal indicates that if one defendant in a 
case files an anti-SLAPP motion at one stage and a different defendant later files a 
different anti-SLAPP motion challenging the same claims, that "alone would be an 
abuse" of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at pp. 982, 999-1000.) Grewal's view that these 
two broad examples constitute abusive anti-SLAPP litigation is wrong and directly 
conflicts with the decisions of this court and the Courts of Appeal as well as the anti-
SLAPP statute's plain language. 
First, this court, the Courts of Appeal, or both have held that the anti-SLAPP 
statute does apply to claims against attorneys (including claims for malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, and malpractice), personal injury claims, and claims 
involving insurers. (E.g., Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Ca1.4th 728, 
732-741 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to malicious prosecution action against attorney]; 
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Ca1.4th 1106, 1109, 1114-
1115 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claims for intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress]; 1 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lee (Jan. 31, 2011, 
C062380) Cal.App.4th [2011 D.A.R. 3170, 3171-3172] [applying anti-SLAPP 
statute to cross-claims against insurer for abuse of process and unfair business 
practices] Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531, 534-542 
[anti-SLAPP statute applied to abuse of process claim against attorney]; Seltzer v. 
Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 958-969 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claim 
against attorney for intentional infliction of emotional distress]; Premier Medical 
Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 
464, 468-477 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claims against insurers]; Peregrine 
Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 
668-675 (Peregrine) [anti-SLAPP statute applied to claims against attorneys for 
1 Claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are personal 
injury claims. (See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 
Ca1.4th 893, 912; Bennett v. Suncloud (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 91, 97.) 
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professional malpractice and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty]; Dickens v. 
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 707-717 [anti-SLAPP 
statute applied to malicious prosecution claims against insurer].) 
While other California appellate courts have either disagreed that the statute 
applies to some of these types of claims or identified instances where the statute might 
not apply to such claims in a specific case if they do not arise from acts in furtherance 
of the constitutional rights to free speech or petition (see Grewal, supra, 191 
Cal.App.4th at p. 999 [collecting cases]), that does not mean the statute never applies to 
claims against attorneys, personal injury claims, or claims involving insurers. This 
case law simply reflects that California's appellate courts have determined that the 
anti-SLAPP statute applies to such claims in some instances but not in others 
depending on the specific bases for particular claims and that courts are split over 
whether the statute applies to certain types of claims, like those for malpractice. 
(Compare, e.g., Peregrine, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 668-675 [anti-SLAPP statute 
applied to claims against attorneys for professional malpractice] with PrediWave Corp. 
v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1224-1228 
[disagreeing with Peregrine and holding anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to 
malpractice claims].) 
Grewal ignores these significant nuances and instead broadly and erroneously 
suggests the anti-SLAPP statute never applies to claims against attorneys, personal 
injury claims, or claims involving insurers. By doing so, Grewal directly conflicts with 
the decisions of this court and the lower appellate courts. 
Second, the fact one defendant files an earlier unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion 
challenging certain claims does not bar another defendant from later filing a proper 
anti-SLAPP motion challenging those claims. The contrary view expressed in Grewal 
conflicts with the plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute, which provides that if a 
court "determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will 
prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination 
shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent 
action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected 
by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(3).) This provision—which Grewal ignores and 
which must be construed broadly (see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a))—bars a court 
from using its finding against one defendant under prong two of the anti-SLAPP 
statute as a basis for denying a different defendant's separate anti-SLAPP motion. 
Moreover, Grewal's contrary view makes no sense. When a plaintiff opposes 
anti-SLAPP motions brought by different defendants in the same lawsuit, the plaintiff 
may have sufficient admissible evidence to show he has a probability of prevailing 
against one defendant but may not have sufficient evidence to show a probability of 
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prevailing against the other defendants. (E.g., Scalzo v. Baker (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 
91, 94-96, 99-102 (Scalzo) [reversing order granting certain defendants' anti-SLAPP 
motion because plaintiffs had shown probability of prevailing against them but 
affirming order granting separate anti-SLAPP motion filed by other defendants 
(including attorney defendants who plaintiffs had sued) because plaintiffs had not 
shown a probability of prevailing against them].) If Grewal's erroneous view of 
supposedly abusive anti-SLAPP litigation were the law, Grewal could not only be in 
conflict with cases like Scalzo but would also promote an improper race between each 
co-defendant to the courthouse to have each co-defendant's anti-SLAPP motion decided 
first to avoid having an anti-SLAPP motion conclusively predetermined as a matter of 
law by another defendant's earlier and unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion. 
In sum, depublication of Grewal is necessary because, by identifying the 
foregoing erroneous examples of abusive anti-SLAPP motions, Grewal is likely to foster 
confusion as to whether such motions may be filed in actions against attorneys, 
personal injury actions, actions involving insurers, or in cases where another defendant 
has previously filed an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion. 
Depublication of Grewal is also necessary because, even assuming Grewal's 
examples of abusive anti-SLAPP litigation were correct (they are not), Grewal's 
overbroad definition of what constitutes an abusive anti-SLAPP motion nonetheless 
threatens to deter defendants from properly invoking the crucial protections of the 
anti-SLAPP statue to protect their vital constitutional rights from SLAPP suits. 
In particular, Grewal suggests anti-SLAPP motions are abusive if they are filed 
in actions against attorneys, personal injury actions, or actions involving insurers 
based on prior appellate decisions in which other appellate courts had concluded the 
anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to particular claims. (See Grewal, supra, 191 
Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) Plaintiffs and courts may thus construe Grewal as broadly 
defining an abusive anti-SLAPP motion as any motion challenging a claim where an 
appellate court had previously concluded the statute did not apply to a similar claim. 
Under this broad standard, a defendant who knows that at least one Court of 
Appeal has held the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to a particular claim might be 
accused of abusing the statute if he nonetheless files an anti-SLAPP motion 
challenging a similar claim. There is a real danger such a defendant would decline to 
bring an anti-SLAPP motion under those circumstances, especially to avoid the threat 
of having fees awarded against him under the anti-SLAPP statute (see Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1))—and thereby be deterred from legitimately taking advantage of 
vital anti-SLAPP legislation designed to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. 
The right to invoke the critical protection of the anti-SLAPP statute against lawsuits 
brought to chill the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights should not be 
conditioned on whether one Court of Appeal has previously held the statute does not 
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apply to a claim in a specific case or whether a co-defendant has previously brought an 
unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion. Otherwise, the anti-SLAPP statute's crucial 
safeguards that are designed to protect the rights to free speech and petition could be 
diluted or even rendered a nullity. 
B. 	 Depublication is necessary because Grewal's dicta relies on misleading 
and incomplete statistics. 
Grewal also relies on the number of pages in the portion of the annotated code 
setting out the anti-SLAPP statute to suggest that the statute has been sorely abused. 
(See Grewal, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 998.) This view regarding the supposed 
"explosion" of allegedly abusive anti-SLAPP motions lead the court to call on the 
Legislature to repeal a defendant's right to immediately appeal from the denial of an 
anti-SLAPP motion because these appeals themselves abusively add to plaintiffs' delay. 
(See id. at pp. 998, 1000-1003.) But the actual facts regarding the number of written 
opinions show that no abuse is occurring—and that Grewal's finding of abusive anti-
SLAPP litigation and its call for a repeal of the defendant's right of appeal are thus 
without merit. 
In 2010, the California intermediate appellate courts and this court decided 102 
appeals (including both published and unpublished opinions) from orders granting or 
denying anti-SLAPP motions. 2 In 2009, 107 such appeals were decided. In 
comparison, the most recent Judicial Council statistics show that in the 2008-2009 
fiscal year, the Courts of Appeal disposed of 11,477 appeals by written opinion. (See 
Judicial Council of Cal., Admin. Off. of Cts., Rep. on Court Statistics (2010) Courts of 
Appeal Table 5, p. 25 (hereafter 2010 Court Statistics Report).) 3 Thus, anti-SLAPP 
opinions by the appellate courts constitute roughly .9 percent of the total appellate 
opinions issued by California courts in recent years. Hardly a crisis. 
More fundamentally, the actual dispositions of anti-SLAPP appeals do not show 
any abuse. The majority of anti-SLAPP appeals (59 in 2009 and 53 in 2010) occurred 
in appeals from orders granting anti-SLAPP motions—appeals that would likely have 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the information for the statistics set forth in this section 
were gathered by searching the Westlaw database of California published and 
unpublished opinions for the terms "anti-slapp /10 motion /p appeal." At the court's 
request, we will provide a chart showing by name each opinion and its disposition. We 
were informed by the Clerk's office that our depublication request would not be filed if 
we appended such an extensive chart to our letter. 
3 This report is at available at the California Courts website. (Court Statistics Report 
<http://www.courts.ca.gov/13421.htm > [as of March 9, 2011].) 
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been taken as appeals from a final judgment irrespective of whether the anti-SLAPP 
statute gave any party a right to appeal. Furthermore, in the appeals from orders 
denying anti-SLAPP motions (49 in 2010 and 48 in 2009), the appellate courts reversed 
22 of these orders, for a 22.6 percent reversal rate. This reversal rate is far greater 
than the general appellate reversal rate of 10 percent and also higher than the reversal 
rates in all civil cases of 19 percent. (See 2010 Court Statistics Report, supra, Courts of 
Appeal Table 6, p. 26.) Thus, far from confirming that defendants are filing meritless 
anti-SLAPP motions and appeals, these statistics confirm that defendants often require 
the immediate right of appeal to vindicate their right to early termination of a 
meritless SLAPP suit. 
Grewal further relies on Judicial Council statistics that show the number of trial 
court anti-SLAPP filings per year as supposed support for its claim that the anti-
SLAPP statute is being misused. (See Grewal, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 998-999.) 
However, the total number of motions filed per year is a misleading measure of 
whether the statute has been abused. According to the same Judicial Council 
spreadsheet that Grewal relied on for its statistics, parties filed a total of 2,881 anti-
SLAPP motions in trial courts throughout California between 2005 and 2010, or 
roughly 481 motions per year. 4 During that six-year period, an appeal was filed in 
only 375 of those cases—i.e., roughly 13 percent of the time (or roughly 62 anti-SLAPP 
appeals on average per year). Put another way, in nearly ninety percent of cases, no 
anti-SLAPP appeal was filed. Moreover, given the 6,199,276 total civil filings in the 
superior courts between the fiscal years of 2005 and 2009 (the latest date for which we 
have data), these 2,881 anti-SLAPP motions constitute only about .046 percent of total 
civil filings. (See 2010 Court Statistics Report, supra, Superior Courts Table 4, p. 47.) 
Thus, the evidence Grewal relies on confirms that there has been no abusive explosion 
of anti-SLAPP litigation. Again, no crisis here. 
In short, there is no evidence that anti-SLAPP motions are overwhelming 
California courts or that there has been an abusive explosion of such motions or 
appeals. In fact, the Legislature accurately predicted the negligible effect the anti-
SLAPP statute's right of appeal would have on appellate courts. The Department of 
Finance's enrolled bill report for Assembly Bill (AB) 1675 (the statute providing an 
immediate right of appeal for the granting or denial of anti-SLAPP motions) (1) 
concluded that under then-existing law (i.e., before defendants had an immediate right 
to appeal anti-SLAPP orders), appellate courts reviewed approximately 30 SLAPP 
motions each year and (2) noted that "the Judicial Council estimate [d] that the SLAPP 
4 At the court's request, we will submit a copy of the extensive spreadsheet from the 
Judicial Council and show how we secured the information cited in our letter. 
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appeals authorized in AB 1675 would result in an increase of approximately 90 
additional cases per year." (Dept. of Finance Enrolled Bill Report AB 1675 (Sept. 16, 
1999).) In 2009 and 2010, the Courts of Appeal decided fewer than the 120 anti-SLAPP 
appeals per year that the Legislature expected would result from AB 1675's revision of 
the anti-SLAPP statute to include an immediate right of appeal. 
Depublication is warranted to strike Grewal's misleading statistics from the 
published reports to avoid confusion among courts and litigants as to whether a 
defendant has filed an abusive anti-SLAPP motion or appeal. As we next explain, the 
Court of Appeal's erroneous "evidence" of abuse of the statute should not be used as a 
court-sanctioned lobbying effort to convince the Legislature to eliminate the immediate 
right of appeal that it specifically added to the anti-SLAPP statute. 
C. 	 Depublication is warranted because Grewal's attempt to lobby for a 
statutory amendment based on misleading data and an erroneous view 
of legislative history should not remain in the published reports. 
Prior to 1999, orders granting anti-SLAPP motions could be "appealed directly 
under most circumstances" but orders denying such motions could "only be reviewed by 
a writ until the proceedings in the trial court" were complete. (Braun, Increasing 
SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California (1999) 32 U.C. 
Davis L.Rev. 965, 1008 (hereafter Braun).) In 1998, at the request of the Judicial 
Council, SLAPP scholars George Pring and Penelope Canan prepared a report that 
recommended seven improvements to the original anti-SLAPP statute, including 
statutory authorization for an immediate right of appeal from orders denying anti-
SLAPP motions. (Braun, California's Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years (2003) 
34 McGeorge L.Rev. 731, 778-779 & fn. 280.) The Judicial Council reported those 
recommendations to the Legislature in 1999 but the Council's report rejected all seven 
recommendations. (Ibid.) In rejecting the proposal for an immediate right of appeal, 
the Judicial Council insisted no such right was necessary because review by writ 
petition was "sufficient." (Braun, supra, at p. 1011 & fn. 182.) The Legislature, 
however, chose to override the Judicial Council's recommendation against an 
immediate right of appeal by enacting AB 1675 that same year, which amended the 
anti-SLAPP statute to expressly provide that "[a]n order granting or denying a special 
motion to strike shall be appealable." (Stats. 1999, ch. 960, § 1, p. 5486.) 
Indeed, AB 1675's legislative history makes plain that the Legislature viewed a 
defendant's right to an immediate appeal as a vitally necessary component of the anti-
SLAPP statute. As a report prepared by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
explained, the "key issue" addressed by AB 1675 was whether "a defendant subject to a 
`S.L.A.P.P. Suit' [should] be permitted to immediately appeal the denial of a special 
motion to strike the law suit?" (Assem. Com
. on Judiciary, Assem. Bill No. 1675 (1999-
2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced March 16, 1999, p. 1.) This report states that AB 1675 
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"furthers the purpose of the Anti-SLAPP Law . . . by allowing the defendant to 
immediately appeal a denial of a special motion to strike. Without this ability, a 
defendant will have to incur the cost of a lawsuit before having his or her right to free 
speech vindicated. When a meritorious anti-SLAPP motion is denied, the defendant, 
under current law, has only two options. The first is to file a writ of appeal, which is 
discretionary and rarely granted. The second is to defend the lawsuit. If the defendant 
wins, the Anti-SLAPP Law is useless and has failed to protect the defendant's 
constitutional rights." (Id. at p. 2; see also Sen. Com . on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 1675 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 1999, p. 3 [recognizing key 
point of AB 1675 was to create right of appeal].) 
In short, AB 1675's legislative history clearly confirms that the Legislature gave 
defendants statutory authorization to immediately appeal orders denying anti-SLAPP 
motions because this right to an appeal was essential to protecting defendants from 
SLAPP suits. (See Varian, Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Ca1.4th 180, 193 
(Varian) [holding that AB 1675's legislative history confirms that Legislature amended 
anti-SLAPP statute to add an immediate right of appeal because, absent the ability to 
appeal, defendants would have to incur costs of a lawsuit to vindicate their 
constitutional rights]; Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 144-145 [observing 
that "[t]he Legislature concluded it was necessary to authorize an immediate appeal" 
and setting forth legislative history explaining why the right of appeal is critical to 
further the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute].) 
Using the erroneous evidence of abuse described above, and, notwithstanding 
the Legislature's rejection of the Judicial Council's resistance to an immediate right of 
appeal, its decision to amend the anti- SLAPP statute to unambiguously permit such 
appeals, and the clear statements in the legislative history confirming the balance the 
Legislature intended to strike, Grewal finds the legislative history for this amendment 
"not particularly illuminating" and concludes a defendant's right to immediately appeal 
orders denying anti-SLAPP motions is insufficiently important to balance out the 
prospect that a plaintiff who successfully opposes an anti-SLAPP motion may be forced 
to incur fees defending his victory. (See Grewal, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1000- 
1003.) Grewal therefore calls on the Legislature to eliminate a defendant's right to 
appeal from orders denying such motions. (See id. at pp. 1002-1003.) 
While it may generally be proper for courts to urge the Legislature to amend a 
law, it is improper for Grewal to do so because its call for legislative action is based on 
misleading statistics that do not support its claimed abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute 
and on an erroneous view of AB 1675's clear legislative history favoring a defendant's 
vital right to immediately appeal from orders denying anti-SLAPP motions. 
Grewal simply provides no legitimate evidence that the anti-SLAPP statute has 
fostered an explosion of abusive motions or appeals. This statute, like any other 
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procedural device, can undoubtedly be abused and may thus, on occasion, result in 
frivolous anti-SLAPP motions and appeals. (See Varian, supra, 35 Ca1.4th at p. 195.) 
But trial and appellate courts are already well-armed to correct these occasional 
instances of abuse. (See id. at p. 196.) Grewal's erroneous examples of abuse and 
misleading statistics are not a proper basis for urging the Legislature to revisit its prior 
determination that the anti-SLAPP statute—including its provision for appellate 
review—is vitally necessary to protect constitutional rights from the destructive impact 
of SLAPP suits. 
Conclusion  
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court should order the Court of Appeal's 
opinion in Grewal not to be published in the official reports. 
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